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Abstract
This paper studies the e¤ects of international outsourcing on individual tran-
sitions out of jobs in the Danish manufacturing sector for the period 1992-2001.
Estimation of a single risk duration model, where no distinction is made between
di¤erent types of transitions out of the job, shows that outsourcing has a clear sig-
nicant positive e¤ect on the job separation rate, but the e¤ect corresponds to a
limited number of lost jobs. A competing risks duration model that distinguishes
between job-to-job and job-to-unemployment transitions is also estimated. Out-
sourcing is found to increase the unemployment risk of workers and in particular
low-skilled workers, but again the quantitative impact is not dramatic. Outsourcing
also increases the job change hazard rate and mostly so for high-skilled workers.
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1 Introduction
The public debate over outsourcing is intense in most advanced countries with commen-
tators, politicians and journalists often painting a bleak picture of the situation on the
labour market claiming that outsourcing leads to massive losses of jobs to low-wage coun-
tries which in particular hurt low-skilled workers. This picture is often based on specic
examples of rms moving jobs abroad and rarely is the debate accompanied by solid evi-
dence showing that labour markets are deteriorating in general. Economists, on the other
hand, typically argue that outsourcing at most gives rise to short run adjustment costs
in the form of spells of unemployment following job displacement. In the long run there
is full employment where some workers may lose through lower wages, but outsourcing is
just another form of trade that has the usual long run gains, and overall these gains more
than outweigh the costs.
In this paper I focus on the impact of outsourcing on short run labour market dynamics
and I do not consider questions related to any long run e¢ ciency gains from outsourcing.
That short run adjustment costs should be taken seriously is for example suggested by
Davidson &Matusz (2004) who show by calibrating a general equilibrium model of trade
with unemployment and training that adjustment costs are a signicant fraction of the
gross benets of a reform that removes trade barriers. It is clear that from the individual
perspective costs related to displacement may be substantial, see e.g. Farber (2005) for
a recent account. Job loss is associated with lower re-employment earnings, long spells
of unemployment for some workers and a higher probability of being part-time employed
when reemployed. However, such costs may very well be small at the aggregate level if
there is only a modest impact of outsourcing on the job separation rate. The purpose
of this paper is to give an assessment of the quantitative importance of the e¤ects of
international outsourcing on the individual job separation rate.
Outsourcing here refers to the splitting up of the production process into stages of
which the components can be produced outside the rm, possibly in low-wage countries.
Thus outsourcing is dened as the use of imported intermediate inputs in production,
and such trade in intermediates has increased signicantly over recent decades, see e.g.
Hummels, Ishii & Yi (2001). I consider two di¤erent measures of outsourcing a broad
and a narrow measure. Following Feenstra & Hanson (1996) the broad measure is dened
in terms of the value of all imported intermediate inputs of an industry, while the narrow
measure restricts attention to intermediate inputs that are purchased from the same
industry as the good being produced (see Feenstra & Hanson (1999)). The idea behind
the narrow measure is that it only includes imported production activity that could have
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been done within the domestic industry.
Only very few papers have studied the impact of outsourcing on job separations which
is surprising given the strong media attention. Using aggregate data for job displace-
ment rates at the industry level in the US Kletzer (2000) and Kletzer (2002) nd that
imported intermediate goods do not have a signicant impact on displacement rates.
This approach can be criticized on two accounts. First, regressing industry displacement
rates on industry-level trade data may produce biased results due to endogeneity, since
turnover rates may instead inuence trade as argued by Davidson & Matusz (2005). Sec-
ond, international outsourcing has consequences for micro units (i.e. workers and rms),
so preferably it should be studied using micro-level data and not industry level data. In
addition, estimating individual transition rates using industry-level outsourcing measures
may help to overcome potential endogeneity problems.
This paper follows the substantial literature that study job turnover at the individual
level. This literature shows for example that the transition from job to nonemployment
di¤ers between gender and education groups (Royalty (1998)), highlighting the impor-
tance to control for such characteristics. It is a well established fact that job turnover
rates decline with time on the job supposedly due to accumulation of match specic human
capital (see e.g. Farber (1994) and Farber (1999)), so it is also important to control for
duration dependence. Furthermore worker characteristics often have distinct impacts on
di¤erent destination states for the transition out of jobs. For example Royalty (1998) dis-
tinguishes between job-to-job and job-to-nonemployment transitions and Zavodny (2003)
distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary separations. To accommodate for these
facts I set up a competing risks duration model that distinguishes between job-to-job and
job-to-unemployment transitions, and there is access to a very detailed register based data
set with information about a long list of worker characteristics.
The results from a single risk duration model, where no distinction is made between
di¤erent types of transitions out of the job, show that outsourcing has a clear signicant
positive e¤ect on the job separation rate, but the e¤ect corresponds to a limited num-
ber of lost jobs. Furthermore, outsourcing is also found to increase the unemployment
risk of workers and in particular low-skilled workers, thus giving some support to the
concern about the state of domestic labour markets put forth in the media. However,
the quantitative impact is again not dramatic. In contrast to popular belief high-skilled
workers are also adversely a¤ected by outsourcing, but this is mostly through an increased
job change hazard rate. That is, outsourcing inuence all skill groups, but high-skilled
workers appear to be capable of avoiding unemployment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the possible
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relationship between international outsourcing and labour demand. Section 3 describes
the data. Section 4 sets up the empirical model, and section 5 presents the estimation
results. Section 6 concludes.
2 International outsourcing and labour demand
From a theoretical standpoint the impact of outsourcing on the demand for labour is
ambiguous, since depending on assumptions and time horizon outsourcing may increase
or reduce the demand for labour of certain types (see e.g. Arndt (1997), Venables (1999),
Kohler (2001) and Kohler (2004)). One the one hand outsourcing of production processes
to low wage countries means lower costs, which could lead to higher labour demand in
the long run. On the other hand outsourcing is by denition about removal of stages
in the production process such that the demand for some workers shifts abroad, so one
should obviously see increased job separations in the short run as a result. It is therefore
largely an empirical question whether labour demand falls or rises as a consequence of
outsourcing.
The empirical literature on outsourcing and labour demand has shown that low skilled
workers tend to lose relative to skilled workers (see Feenstra & Hanson (1996) and Feenstra
& Hanson (1999) for the US, Geishecker (2002) for Germany and Hijzen, Görg & Hine
(2005) for the UK). These papers use aggregate data for industries, and so it is unclear
whether lower demand is manifested through falling wages or falling employment or both.
To study this issue the e¤ects on employment and wages must be analysed separately,
and in this case access to micro data is called for.
Geishecker & Görg (2004) use German micro data to assess the impact of international
outsourcing (at the industry level) on the individual wage level in a human capital frame-
work. They nd that outsourcing generally reduces the wages of low-skilled workers and
increases the wages of high-skilled workers. In addition Geishecker & Görg (2005) show
that these results depend on the industries under consideration. Low-skilled workers only
lose if they are employed in low-skill intensive industries, while high-skilled workers only
gain from positive wage e¤ects if they are employed in high-skill intensive industries.
The impact of international outsourcing on individual employment histories in ad-
vanced countries has not been the subject of intense scrutiny. The study that comes
closest to this paper is Egger, Pfa¤ermayr & Weber (2003), since they also assess the
e¤ects of trade variables on individual labour market transitions.1 Estimating a xed
1To the best of my knowledge this is the only other paper that investigates the e¤ects of trade on
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e¤ects multinomial logit model for transitions of Austrian males between six di¤erent
labour market states (unemployment, out of the labour force and employment in four
di¤erent sectors), they nd that increases in industry imports and outsourcing (measured
as the share of imported intermediate inputs in total imports) reduce the probability of
changing into the manufacturing sector and in particular industries with a comparative
disadvantage. They are mainly interested in the transitions into specic industries, but in
an extension of their model they also nd that rising import competition and outsourcing
reduce the probability of workers in a comparative disadvantage industry to stay there. In
contrast, since the major part of the public debate on outsourcing is concerned with the
associated loss of jobs, I focus exclusively on the transitions out of jobs. One concern with
the results of Egger et al. (2003) is that they do not control for individual characteristics
(except age), so it is not clear if the e¤ect of outsourcing instead could be attributed to
e.g. education. For example outsourcing intensive industries could also be intensive in
the use of workers with specic skills and these skills may be the determinant of turnover
and not outsourcing.
3 Data description
The empirical analysis is based on data from the Danish labour market, and it consists
of information about individual employment histories coupled with outsourcing measures
at the industry level. The Danish labour market is an interesting case to analyze because
employment protection is weak (Nicoletti, Scarpetta & Boylaud (2000)), and this have led
to turnover rates and an average tenure which are in line with those of the Anglo-Saxon
countries. In 1995 the average tenure in the Danish labour market was the lowest in
continental Europe with 7.9 years exceeding only the numbers for Australia, USA and
UK (6.4, 7.4 and 7.8 years respectively), cf. OECD (1997). At the same time Denmark is
a very open economy that have experienced signicant increases in outsourcing volumes
in recent decades.
3.1 Micro data
The dataset is a 10 % sample of the Danish population for the years 1992-2001. In each
year detailed information about the labour market states of all individuals is available
along with information about demographic and socio economic characteristics. These
variables are extracted from the integrated database for labour market research (IDA) and
individual transitions in the labour market.
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the income registers in Statistics Denmark. Of particular importance is that a workplace
identity is associated with each worker in week 48 in each year. Job spells are then
straightforwardly constructed from successive years at the same workplace.
It is the duration of job spells in manufacturing industries and the di¤erent transitions
out of the current job that are of interest. The job spells are ow sampled such that only
spells starting in 1993 and later are included in the analysis (thus avoiding problems with
left-censoring)2. The destination state for all spells that end before 2002 is known and I
focus on spells that end with a transitions into a new job (i.e. a new workplace identity),
into unemployment and into nonparticipation. If job spells are uncompleted in 2001
then they are treated as right censored observations. Also job spells are treated as right
censored observations if they end because of a rm closure. To increase the homogeneity
of the sample all part time employed, self employed, students with jobs and persons below
the age of 18 have been excluded.
Outsourcing is about removal of production processes in the domestic economy, so
this should give rise to workers being laid o¤. However, it is not possible to distinguish
between quits and lay o¤s in the data. Instead the transition from jobs to unemployment is
considered, since in the event of a lay o¤ it is likely that the worker is unemployed for some
time. Also what is relevant from a welfare perspective is the quantitative importance of
the e¤ect of outsourcing on the transition rate into unemployment. Because the job spells
are based on annual observations it is possible that the workers have had intermediate
unemployment spells of duration less than a year between two jobs. Thus to focus on
"pure" job changes a transition is only counted as a job-to-job change if the worker has
not collected UI benets in the year of job change. If the worker received UI benets
in the year of the transition out of the job then this transition is counted as a job-to-
unemployment transition. It should be noted that even for job-to-job changes without
intermediate spells of unemployment a high fraction is caused by a lay-o¤.3 This is possible
in exible labour markets as the Danish, and it is therefore also likely that outsourcing
a¤ects the job change probability.
The empirical hazard rates for transitions into a new job, unemployment and nonpar-
2Flow sampling means that the sample is not representative of the stock of manufacturing workers, as
relatively long job spells are undersampled. The resulting sample of workers (see Table 1) is on average
younger and have less labour market experience than manufacturing workers in general. For example the
13 years of labour market experience in the sample is 3 years less than manufacturing workers in general.
However, since the econometric model controls for many individual characteristics age and experience
included this should not matter for the estimated impact of international outsourcing.
3According to Browning, Danø & Heinesen (2004) more than half of displaced workers in the Danish
labour market have no unemployment at all in the displacement year.
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ticipation are simply dened as the fraction of those making a given transition in year t
among those surviving until that year, and they are depicted in Figure 1. The transition
rate into a new job is highest, followed by the transition into unemployment, and they
are both declining with time on the job perhaps reecting accumulation of match specic
human capital. In contrast the transition rate into nonemployment is a relatively unlikely
event and this transition rate is roughly constant over the job spell.
Insert Figure 1 about here
A long list of socio economic characteristics are used as control variables in the analysis.
Self explanatory dummies for age, gender, the presence of children, the presence of two
adults in the household, education and experience are included. There are dummies for
not being a member of an unemployment insurance fund and trade union membership.
There is also a dummy for the size of the workplace in terms of the workforce. The hourly
wage rate is also used as a control variable in the analysis, and the available wage rate
variable from the IDA register in a given year is calculated as total labour income divided
by the total number of hours worked. To capture business cycle e¤ects the GDP growth
rate and local unemployment rates based on 51 local labour markets4 are included.
3.2 Industry-level data
The other important variables are the measures for international outsourcing. Informa-
tion about outsourcing activities is not available at the rm level, so I follow much of
the literature and measure outsourcing at the industry level (55 manufacturing industries
based on a Danish industry code which is between the two-digit and three-digit NACE
denition) in terms of imported intermediates in production. As noted in the introduction
using industry-level measures of outsourcing has the advantage of reducing potential endo-
geneity problems that might arise if rm-specic outsourcing measures were used. That
is, the outsourcing intensity of an industry is likely to be exogenous to the individual
worker, since individual behaviour does not a¤ect aggregated variables for the industry.
Feenstra & Hanson (1996) and Feenstra & Hanson (1999) suggest two di¤erent mea-
sures of outsourcing a broad and a narrow measure. The broad measure is dened here
as the value of all imported intermediate inputs of an industry divided by the industrys
production value, while the narrow measure restricts attention to intermediate inputs
that are purchased from the same industry as the good being produced (again divided
4The local labour markets are socalled commuting areas that are dened such that the internal mi-
gration rate is 50 % higher than the external migration rate, cf. Andersen (2000).
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by the industrys value of production). The idea behind the narrow measure is that it
only includes imported production activity that could have been done within the domestic
industry. These two measures are constructed from input-output tables for imports from
Statistics Denmark and shown for the years 1980-2000 in Figure 2 for all manufacturing
industries. For the sample period the broad measure of outsourcing rises from 17.0 percent
in 1993 to 19.9 percent in 2000 representing an increase of 17 percent, and the narrow
measure rises from 4.3 percent to 5.4 percent corresponding to a rise of 22 percent.
Insert Figure 2 about here
Among industries with a relatively high level of outsourcing are manufacture of wearing
apparel, manufacture of leather and leather products, manufacture of radio, television
and communication equipment in terms of the broad measure they all have outsourcing
ratios of almost 40 percent. The industry experiencing the highest growth (90 percent)
in the broad outsourcing measure in the sample period from 1993-2000 was manufacture
of wearing apparel.
Technological change is often found to a¤ect labour demand and could thus have an
inuence on employment transitions. To control for such e¤ects the industrys research
and development intensity is included.5 Furthermore, to control for other industry per-
formance characteristics, the capital output ratio, a concentration ratio dened as the
market share of the four biggest rms of each industry and following Davidson &Matusz
(2005) net exports in terms of total production has been included. Also the industrys
output growth is included along with the share of the industry workforce with basic and
further education respectively.
In the nal data set there are 150,463 observations where one observation is one year
in on job spell. The number of job spells is 60,570 and they come from 43,447 individuals.
Descriptive statistics for the data set are presented in Table 1.
Insert Table 1 about here
4 Econometric model
In studies of individual job separations, it is essential to control for state dependence since
the job separation rate typically declines with time on the job due to the accumulation of
5R&D data at the two digit industry level were obtained from the OECD ANBERD data base and is
in the empirical model measured in terms of the industrys value added. The data were only available
for the years 1993-1999, and so the R&D intensity for 2000 was imputed with a linear trend.
8
match specic human capital (see e.g. Farber (1999) for an overview). To that end this
section sets up a duration model, which accommodates for right censored job spells and
allows for duration dependency in the transition process out of the current job. Further,
to distinguish between transitions from employment to e.g. unemployment and a new job
a competing risks duration model is specied (Sueyoshi (1992)). Even if there is access
to a dataset that facilitates control for much individual heterogeneity, there might still
be some unobserved heterogeneity left. Thus, a mixed proportional hazard model for the
job transitions is specied, i.e. the destination specic hazard rates are:
i(tjxt; i) = i(t) exp(xti + i); (1)
where i = 1; ::;m indicates the di¤erent destination states for transitions out of the job
spell, i(t) is the baseline hazard capturing the time dependence, and exp(xti+i) is the
systematic part giving the proportional e¤ects of observed and time-varying characteristics
at time t, xt; and unobserved characteristics, i (see e.g. van den Berg (2001) for a survey
of this class of duration models). All job spells that end with a transition to other states
than those modelled are treated as right censored.
The annual observations in the data imply that the duration variable T is grouped into
K +1 intervals f[0; t1); [t1;t2); ::; [tk;1)g which must be accounted for in the econometric
setup. Following Kiefer (1990) the interval specic survival rate is dened as
k = P (T  tkjT  tk 1; x; )
= exp
"
 
mX
i=1
Z tk
tk 1
i(tjxt; i)dt
#
= exp
"
 
mX
i=1
exp(xki + i)i;k
#
(2)
=
mY
i=1
i;k;
where i;k =
R tk
tk 1
i(t)dt and i;k = exp [  exp(xki + i)i;k] :
To nd the contribution to the likelihood function from a job spell it is noted that
the probability that a spell ends in interval k is given by the conditional probability of
failure in that interval times the probability that the spell survives until interval k; or
(1   k)
Qk 1
j=1 j: Some spells are right censored and they contribute to the likelihood
with the survivor function,
Qk
j=1 j: Thus the contribution to the likelihood function
from a job spell can be written
Le =
mY
i=1
(1  i;k)di1 
m
i di
k
k 1Y
j=1
j; (3)
9
where d1; ::; dm are destination state indicators. If the job spell is right censored then
d1 = :: = dm = 0: Instead of imposing a functional form on the baseline hazard I allow for
a exible specication by simply estimating the interval specic baseline parameters i;k.
The unobserved heterogeneity is specied by the stochastic variables V1; ::; Vm: It is as-
sumed that the unobserved heterogeneity is time invariant and since each worker possibly
contribute with more than one job spell, the draw from the distribution of unobservables
is restricted to be the same across job spells for the same individual. Thus, the complete
contribution to the likelihood function for a worker with J job spells is
L =
JY
l=1
Z
V1
::
Z
Vm
Lle(tjxt; V1; ::; Vm)dF (V1; ::; Vm); (4)
where F is the joint CDF for the unobserved heterogeneity. I follow Heckman & Singer
(1984) by choosing a discrete distribution, and it is assumed that each stochastic variable
can take two values each with an associated probability. Thus, altogether there are 2m
points of support.
5 Results
In the rst set of results I have estimated the model without a distinction between the
di¤erent destination states for the job separations, so this reduces to a single risk duration
model. Four versions of the model with di¤erent sets of industry-level variables included
are estimated; see Table 2. It is rst noted that for all four models the estimated baseline
parameters reveals that the probability of a job separation declines with job tenure (not
shown).
Insert Table 2 about here
The e¤ects of the individual specic variables are robust to the inclusion of the dif-
ferent sets of industry specic variables. It is seen that e.g. younger workers and low
skilled workers have shorter job spells (i.e. a higher job separation rate). Labour market
experience reduces the risk of a job separation, and membership of UI funds and unions
increases the separation rate. A higher wage rate seems to increase the likelihood of a job
separation, although the e¤ect is insignicant in model 4. However, this e¤ect should be
interpreted with caution, since it may be endogenous. For the present purposes I include
the wage variable mainly to control for heterogeneity.
The main variable of interest is the outsourcing measure, and in model 1 the broad
measure has been included as the only industry specic variable. There is a signicant
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positive impact on the job separation rate of working in industries with high intensities of
broad outsourcing. In model 2 all the other industry characteristics are included as control
variables, which implies that the coe¢ cient to broad outsourcing doubles. The quantita-
tive importance of the estimated coe¢ cient of 0.4754 can be assessed by calculating the
relative (percentage) change in the separation rate in response to a 1 percentage point in-
crease in the outsourcing measure as follows: exp(0.4754*0.01)-1=0.004765. That is, the
separation rate rises 0.48 percent if the broad outsourcing measure rises one percentage
point.
With respect to the other industry variables it is noteworthy that the R&D intensity
reduces the probability of a job separation while the net export ratio increases the job
separation rate. The latter result is perhaps surprising if the perception is that imports
displace domestic jobs (which is what Kletzer (2000) nd for the US). However, here a
higher job separation rate is not necessarily the same as a higher job displacement rate,
since the job separation rate also encompasses quits and voluntary job changes. That is,
the result could simply reect that export industries have a higher level of churning.
In model 3 the broad measure of outsourcing is replaced with the narrow measure,
where focus is on imported goods that could have been produced within the domestic
industry. Again there is a positive e¤ect on the job separation rate, but it is not as
strong, and it is only signicant at the 10 percent level. Therefore if one seeks an upper
bound on the impact of outsourcing on job separations then the broad measure should be
considered since it includes the narrow measure plus imported intermediates from other
industries.
Suppose one were given the task to nd the level of the job separation rate in the
rather unrealistic world of no outsourcing. Then, according to the parameter estimate
from model 2 for the year 2000 where the average level of outsourcing was 0.199, up
to 9.9 percent of the overall job separation rate can be explained by broad outsourcing.
With 65.000 annual job separations in the manufacturing sector this amounts to around
6.400 separations. Provided that the impact of outsourcing in other sectors than the
manufacturing sector is negligible this number should be compared to a total annual
destruction of jobs in the Danish economy of 260.000 (cf. Danish Economic Council
(2002)), so in that light the employment consequences of outsourcing seem rather modest.
Of course this is only a very crude approximation and should not be taken too seriously,
but it nevertheless illustrates that outsourcing in the worst case has a fairly small impact
on the probability of a job separation.
It is often claimed that outsourcing hurts low skilled workers in particular, while other
skill groups may gain from outsourcing. To see if this is true when it comes to the job
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separation rate I have in model 4 included interaction terms between the broad outsourcing
measure and dummies for whether the individual has basic education or further education
(the reference is vocational education). Neither of the interaction terms enter the model
with a signicant coe¢ cient, but this could be because the e¤ects are blurred by opposing
e¤ects on the job change hazard rate and the unemployment hazard rate. This issue is
considered next.
Some factors may have unequal and even opposite inuence on the destination-specic
hazard rates (i.e. the transitions from employment into a new job, unemployment or non-
participation). In that case the estimates from the single risk model mask these di¤erences,
and so important results may be overlooked if only the single risk model is considered. In
the present context this is particularly important as outsourcing of production activities
to other countries is mainly associated with short run costs if it leads to unemployment or
withdrawal from the labour force. If most workers get a new job immediately this is less of
a problem although they could still face a lower wage in the new job. To investigate this
issue the competing risks formulation of the empirical model with a distinction between
job-to-job and job-to-unemployment transitions is estimated, the results of which are
presented in Table 36. Labour market experience is an example of a variable that a¤ects
the two hazard rates di¤erently as the job change probability is rising with experience
while the unemployment hazard falls with experience. In the single risk models the
negative e¤ect dominated thus covering the fact that there is a positive inuence on the
likelihood of a job change. Another example is union membership; members tend to
change jobs less frequently while they are more exposed to becoming unemployed than
non-members. Furthermore gender and the wage rate have opposite e¤ects on the hazard
rates. As also suggested by Royalty (1998) these results underline the importance of
controlling for individual heterogeneity in studies of transitions in the labour market.
Insert Table 3 about here
The competing risks model also uncovers many interesting results regarding the industry-
level variables. It is seen that employment in industries that use workers with further ed-
ucation relatively intensively is associated with higher job change probabilities and lower
unemployment transition rates. It is also revealed that the negative e¤ect of R&D in-
tensity in the single risk models is driven by a negative e¤ect on the unemployment risk
6I did not estimate the job-to-nonparticipation hazard rate partly because this transition is a rather
rare event (see Figure 1) and preliminary results suggest that outsourcing only have a small (negative)
impact on this hazard rate, and partly to save space. Instead these transitions are treated as right
censored observations.
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while there is no signicant impact on the job change hazard rate. The interaction terms
between the R&D intensity and the individual education dummies are insignicant so
R&D has a uniform e¤ect across skill groups.
The net export ratio was found to have a positive impact on the job separation rate in
the single risk models, and the results from the competing risks model reveal that there is a
positive e¤ect on both the job-to-job and job-to-unemployment transition rates. However,
the interaction terms show that all three skill groups have a higher job change transition
rate the higher the industrys net export ratio, but this e¤ect is signicantly stronger for
workers with further education. Also the positive e¤ect on the unemployment risk can
exclusively be attributed to a positive e¤ect for workers with further education, while
the unemployment hazard for workers with basic and vocational education is una¤ected
by the net export ratio. Thus it appears that it is particularly high-skilled workers that
experience a higher job turnover rate in relatively export intensive industries.
With respect to the impact of international outsourcing I have in the competing risks
model included the narrow outsourcing measure along with the di¤erence between broad
and narrow outsourcing thus capturing imported intermediates not from the same indus-
try. In addition these two outsourcing measures are interacted with individual education
dummies. For the job change hazard it is found that there is a positive e¤ect of narrow
outsourcing, but again this e¤ect can be attributed to workers with further education.
The e¤ect of the variable measuring the di¤erence between broad and narrow outsourcing
also di¤ers for di¤erent skill groups, i.e. workers with just basic education appear to
change jobs less frequently the higher the outsourcing intensity, while the opposite is true
for the remaining two skill groups. In exible labour markets such as the Danish it is
often the case that displaced workers nd jobs immediately thus resulting in a job-to-job
transition. Therefore the results indicate that high-skilled workers may be a¤ected by
outsourcing, but that they are capable of nding a new job without intermediate spells
of unemployment.
Turning to the e¤ects of outsourcing on the job-to-unemployment transition rate it is
seen that only workers with just basic education have their unemployment risk increased
by narrow outsourcing. The parameter estimate for this e¤ect corresponds to a 1.3 percent
higher unemployment risk if narrow outsourcing rises 1 percentage point, which is what
happened during the sample period from 1993 to 2000. The di¤erence between broad and
narrow outsourcing also increases the unemployment risk, but here it hits all three skill
groups uniformly. Thus outsourcing clearly hurts workers in the manufacturing industries
in terms of increased unemployment risk, but the quantitative importance of the e¤ects
is fairly modest.
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5.1 Extensions and robustness of the results
This section briey reports the results of a number of extensions of the model. First, it
is reasonable to suspect that the impact of outsourcing on the job change hazard rate
depends on whether it is a job change within the current industry or between industries.
One would expect that workers in outsourcing intensive industries are more likely to
change jobs to other industries than to remain in the same industry. To study this
question I have estimated a competing risks model with a distinction between within and
between industry job changes, and the results are as expected. Outsourcing (broad or
narrow) has a clear positive impact on the between industry job change hazard, while the
e¤ect on the within industry job change hazard is smaller but still positive.
Second, it may be the case that the e¤ects of outsourcing depend on the industries
under consideration. For example Geishecker & Görg (2005) nd that outsourcing only
reduce the wages of low-skilled workers if they are employed in low-skill intensive indus-
tries. Likewise it may be hypothesized that outsourcing primarily displaces workers in
industries with a comparative disadvantage, see Egger et al. (2003). To analyse this is-
sue I divide the manufacturing industries into two groups along two di¤erent dimension;
according to the fraction of workers with further education in the industry and according
to the net export ratio of the industry. Somewhat surprisingly outsourcing seems to have
fairly similar e¤ects across industries. In all four cases workers with further education
tend to change jobs more often as a response to narrow outsourcing compared to other
skill groups. The same holds true for the di¤erence between broad and narrow outsourc-
ing except for industries that use high-skilled workers most intensively. This group of
industries also di¤ers with respect to the e¤ect of narrow outsourcing in that it seems
to disappear for workers in these industries. Otherwise it is always workers with basic
education that are hurt by narrow outsourcing. Finally the di¤erence between broad and
narrow outsourcing tend to a¤ect the unemployment risk in the same way as in Table 3
across all four industry groupings.
A third issue is that the individual wage is likely to be endogenous. As previously
stated I have included the wage variable to control for heterogeneity, but to the extent
that it is endogenous it may enter the model and a¤ect other variables in an unpredictable
way. For that reason I also estimated the model without the wage variable, but it did not
a¤ect the sign or size of the e¤ects of outsourcing.
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6 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the consequences of international outsourcing for individual
job separations in the Danish labour market. Contrary to most of the empirical literature
on outsourcing the paper uses micro data on labour market transitions, which is appropri-
ate because outsourcing inuences individual workers. The empirical model is a duration
model that controls for individual worker heterogeneity and duration dependence. This
is essential because worker characteristics clearly inuences the transition rates out of
employment, and it is also a well established fact that job separation rates declines with
time on the job.
Overall it is found that outsourcing has a clear signicant positive e¤ect on the job
separation rate, but that it is of limited quantitative importance. A very crude approx-
imation of an upper bound on the number of jobs lost as a consequence of outsourcing
is 6.400 annual separations in the manufacturing sector. If outsourcing is unimportant
in other sectors than manufacturing then this should be compared to a total annual de-
struction of jobs in the Danish economy of 260.000, in which case outsourcing only has a
modest contribution.
Another feature of the model is that di¤erent destination states for the transition rates
out of the job can be estimated. This is important because many variables outsourcing
included have unequal and sometimes even opposite inuence on the job-to-job and
job-to-unemployment transitions. Outsourcing is found to increase the unemployment
risk of workers and in particular relatively low-skilled workers. Thus some workers expe-
rience short run welfare losses due to spells of unemployment, but again the quantitative
impact is not dramatic. Furthermore many layo¤s leads to job-to-job transitions without
intermediate spells of unemployment, and outsourcing is also found to increase the job
change hazard rate particularly so for relatively high-skilled workers.
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A Appendix: Tables and gures
Table 1. Sample means
Variables Mean Stdv.
Age 18-24 0.1610 0.3675
Age 25-29 0.1741 0.3792
Age 30-39 0.2031 0.4023
Age 40-49 0.3277 0.4694
Age 50 + 0.1341 0.3408
Female 0.2960 0.4565
Children 0-17 years 0.2490 0.4324
Two adults 0.6722 0.4694
Basic education 0.4134 0.4924
Vocational education 0.4236 0.4941
Further education 0.1630 0.3693
Labour market experience (years/100) 0.1311 0.0891
Non insured 0.1056 0.3073
Union member 0.8356 0.3707
Log wage (DKR/10) 0.5091 0.0389
Firm size 50+ 0.6911 0.4621
Local unemployment rate (/10) 0.6773 0.2396
Industry characteristics:
Basic education share 0.3847 0.0919
Further education share 0.1522 0.1045
Output growth 0.0281 0.0952
Capital output ratio (/10) 0.1017 0.0313
R&D 0.0514 0.0634
Concentration ratio 0.5338 0.1783
Net exports -0.0509 0.2517
Outsourcing broad 0.2035 0.0807
Outsourcing narrow 0.0508 0.0484
# observations 150,463
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Table 3. Estimation results: competing risks model
Job change
hazard
Unemployment
hazard
Variables Coe¤. Std. err. Coe¤. Std. err.
Age 18-24 0.5569 0.0303 0.0229 0.0336
Age 25-29 0.2257 0.0236 -0.0100 0.0288
Age 40-49 -0.3176 0.0263 0.1709 0.0313
Age 50 + -0.6490 0.0371 0.4193 0.0399
Female -0.2251 0.0204 0.1378 0.0230
Children 0-17 years 0.0092 0.0213 0.0691 0.0267
Two adults 0.0058 0.0197 -0.3007 0.0227
Basic education 0.0793 0.0499 0.0342 0.0610
Further education -0.1296 0.0653 -0.3266 0.1015
Experience 0.7879 0.1613 -4.3790 0.1889
Non insured -0.0313 0.0294 -1.7172 0.0492
Union member -0.0672 0.0222 0.5065 0.0352
Log wage 2.7439 0.2567 -6.7234 0.3468
Firm size 50+ -0.1971 0.0175 -0.2959 0.0211
Local unemployment -0.1930 0.0352 0.4553 0.0403
Basic education share 0.6698 0.1375 0.4942 0.1705
Further education share 1.0414 0.1512 -1.4758 0.2121
Output growth -0.7155 0.0798 -0.1233 0.0961
Capital output ratio 0.1565 0.2825 -1.5424 0.4045
Concentration ratio 0.0543 0.0575 0.3000 0.0687
R&D intensity -0.2977 0.2706 -2.0498 0.3803
R&D intensity  basic edu. 0.0386 0.3064 0.5891 0.4293
R&D intensity  further edu. 0.4178 0.3207 -0.0934 0.5788
Net exports 0.1472 0.0514 0.0685 0.0648
Net exports  basic edu. -0.0765 0.0744 -0.0717 0.0854
Net exports  further edu. 0.3166 0.0954 0.3602 0.1575
Outsourcing narrow 0.0909 0.2985 -0.2610 0.3792
Outsourcing narrow  basic edu. -0.5243 0.4095 1.2864 0.4755
Outsourcing narrow  further edu. 1.3785 0.5070 0.6424 0.8149
Outsourcing di¤. 0.6729 0.1912 1.7191 0.2466
Outsourcing di¤.  basic edu. -1.0892 0.2681 -0.3048 0.3196
Outsourcing di¤.  further edu. 0.9950 0.3450 0.1712 0.5349
j;2 1.8027 0.0368
u;2 2.2145 0.0391
P (j;1; u;1) 0.8258 0.0052
P (j;2; u;1) 0.0001 0.0035
P (j;1; u;2) 0.0001 0.0052
P (j;2; u;2) 0.1740 0.0065
Note: Bold numbers ind icate a sign icant param eter estim ate (5 % level).
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Figure 1: Empirical destination specic hazard rates
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Figure 2: Outsourcing in Danish manufacturing industries
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